Abstract

In this book, French develops and defends a "non-objectivist" theory of the origin and function of moral concepts. In his own words, "a morality... is best seen as a collection of conventions designed to guide the choices of persons; those conventions have the not necessarily intended collective effect of being a system of defense against the tendency of any person to act in a way threatening to the future well-being of the members of the community". In chapter 2, he presents an account of moral concepts as "mixed mode" ideas in Locke's sense, i.e., as combinations of simple ideas "that are not offered, to us in the combined form by 'the real existence of things', but that we assemble or frame to meet certain of our specific needs". The needs that provide the raison d'etre of morality are "the preservation and the betterment of the society to which persons are drawn by reciprocal fear, and held by natural affection and advantage rather than by pure self interest, and only in which can they hope to achieve a sense of worth ". There are resonances of such a view in other recently stated views about the nature of morality and moral concepts, e.g., those of Julius Kovesi, J. L. Mackie, and G. J. Warnock. French acknowledges a debt to these thinkers among others, especially to Kovesi, and also to Donald Davidson.