Challenges to Audi's ethical intuitionism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413 (2002)

Abstract

Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
160 (#75,629)

6 months
1 (#386,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen

References found in this work

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge.David Kaspar - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):155-172.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Renewing Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Some Remarks on Robert Audi's the Good in the Right.Candace Vogler - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
Critical Notice of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right.Anthony Skelton - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):305-325.
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Robert Audi - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Globalization, Globalized Ethics and Moral Theory.Vojko Strahovnik - 2009 - Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):209-218.
Moral Value and Human Diversity.Robert Audi - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
On Audi's Marriage of Ross and Kant.Thomas Hurka - 2007 - In Mark Timmons, John Greco & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford University Press. pp. 64-72.