Epistemological dimensions of informational privacy

Episteme 10 (2):179-192 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It seems obvious that informational privacy has an epistemological component; privacy or lack of privacy concerns certain kinds of epistemic relations between a cogniser and sensitive pieces of information. One striking feature of the fairly substantial philosophical literature on informational privacy is that the nature of this epistemological component of privacy is only sparsely discussed. The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on the epistemological component of informational privacy



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,347

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

92 (#187,535)

6 months
22 (#124,872)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.
Inferences and the Right to Privacy.Jakob Mainz - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
Privacy.Judith DeCew - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Why privacy is important.James Rachels - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4):323-333.
The right to privacy.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4):295-314.
Concealment and Exposure.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):3-30.

View all 9 references / Add more references