Topoi:1-12 (forthcoming)

Authors
Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one’s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8
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References found in this work BETA

Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.
Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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