Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement

Topoi 40 (5):1039-1050 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one’s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Problem of Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):7-25.
Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement.Ranalli Chris - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 79:50-55.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement.Steven W. Patterson - 2015 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 6 (2).
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.


Added to PP

128 (#136,264)

6 months
13 (#147,845)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.
Rationally Maintaining a Worldview.Christopher Ranalli - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (9):1-14.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.

View all 16 references / Add more references