Practical and scientific rationality: A bayesian perspective on Levi's difficulty

Synthese 57 (3):277 - 282 (1983)
In Practical and Scientific Rationality: A Difficulty for Levi's Epistemology, Wayne Backman points to genuine difficulties in Isaac Levi's epistemology, difficulties that Backman attributes to Levi's having required, and for no good reason, that a rational person adopt but one standard of possibility for all her endeavors practical and scientific. I argue that Levi's requirement has, in fact, a deep and compelling motivation that tips the scales in favor of a different diagnosis of Levi's ills — i.e., that Levi's error lies simply in his having set insufficiently high qualifications for admission into the corpus that determines a person's standard of possibility.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064699
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