The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness

Abstract
Two claims have been prominent in recent discussion of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible {Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that awareness of self accompanies at least all those conscious states through which one refers to something. The latter {Ubiquity Thesis) has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano and Sartre, but recently variants have been defended by D. Henrich and M. Frank. Facing criticism from three arguments which nevertheless cannot decisively refute the Self-Ascription theory it turns out that Frank is correct to seek the grounds for the Ubiquity Thesis in indexical thinking and that his insights can be exploited in an alternative argument for the Ubiquity Thesis
Keywords Consciousness  Epistemology  Self-awareness  Self-consciousness  Frank, M
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DOI 10.5840/gps1999573
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