Neuroethics 2 (1):51-59 (2009)

Abstract
Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience’s conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves.
Keywords Bioethics  Free will  Identity  Neuroethics  Self
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s12152-008-9020-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,899
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century.Neil Levy - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Evidence for Free Will Revisionism.Chris Weigel - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
156 ( #60,640 of 2,402,067 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #552,323 of 2,402,067 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes