In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research. Volume CV. Springer. pp. 209-220 (2010)

Ihor Karivets
State University Lvivska Polytechnic
This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontoligy, which is based on intentionality.The author proves that such dualism is rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible our empirical experience on the basis of subject-object relations. The author considers Parmenides' famous sentence "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" and Husserl's well-known claim "Back to things themselves!" as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional relation between Self and Other, between human being and nature/cosmos. There are the division and the rupture between subject and object in a natural attitude. Parmenides and early Husserl show the way to the truth as a wholeness without struggle between subject and object
Keywords non-intentional consciousness, self, other, being-in-between, non-dualism
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