How Settled are Settled Beliefs in “The Fixation of Belief”?

Jeff Kasser
Colorado State University
Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition to resist being undermined, and so the question arises of how resistant to what sorts of undermining influences a belief needs to be in order to count as fixed in Peirce’s sense. Does Peirce, especially in “The Fixation of ..
Keywords Peirce  Belief  Doubt
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DOI 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.2.226
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Genuine Belief and Genuine Doubt in Peirce.Jeff Kasser - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):840-853.

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