Intuitionism and Nihilism

Philosophia 46 (2):319-336 (2018)

David Kaspar
St. John's University
Intuitionism and nihilism, according to nihilists, have key features in common: the same semantics and the same phenomenology. Intuitionism is the object of nihilism’s attack. The central charge nihilism lodges against intuitionism is that its nonnatural moral properties are queer. Here I’ll examine what ‘queer’ might mean in relation to the doctrines nihilism uses to support this charge. My investigation reveals that nihilism’s queerness charge lacks substance and resembles a tautology served with a frown. There’s really nothing to it. After I show that, I’ll offer an explanation for why nihilism has gotten intuitionism wrong. It makes a central mistaken methodological assumption and doesn’t target any identifiable intuitionism in the last hundred or so years.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9930-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary & George Edward Moore - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.

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