Mind 116 (464):903-926 (2007)

Authors
Bernard Katz
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. Thus, on our approach to the paradox, the fallacy, in each formulation, is found in the reasoning underlying the relevant utility matrix; in both cases, the paradoxical argument goes astray before one gets to questions of probability or calculations of expected utility
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm903
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
The Contingent a Priori and Rigid Designators.Keith S. Donnellan - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):12-27.

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