Epistemic virtue and epistemic responsibility

Dialectica 55 (2):105–118 (2001)
In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend to vindicate the initial grounding of virtue epistemology in reliabilist intuitions. (edited).
Keywords belief, epistemology, RESPONSIBILITY, virtue, williams b
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2001.tb00209.x
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Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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