Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation

Abstract
I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘ hybrid models ’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants ’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to model implications about which there is real uncertainty. My conclusion provides criteria of adequacy for epistemologies of climate and other hybrid models
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axs002
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References found in this work BETA
Dissecting Explanatory Power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.
Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling.W. S. Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations.Jim Bogen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.
Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemology of Climate Models and Some of its Implications for Climate Science and the Philosophy of Science.Joel Katzav - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):228-238.
Assessing Climate Model Projections: State of the Art and Philosophical Reflections.Joel Katzav, Henk A. Dijkstra & A. T. J. de Laat - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (4):258-276.
Allocating Confirmation with Derivational Robustness.Aki Lehtinen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2487-2509.
Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
Inference to the More Robust Explanation.Nicholaos Jones - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):75-102.

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