Nietzsche's theory of mind: Consciousness and conceptualization

European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31 (2005)
Abstract
I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states have a conceptual articulation renders comprehensible Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is "superficial" and "falsifying.".
Keywords Nietzsche  consciousness  unconscious  nonconceptual content  conscious
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DOI 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00220.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
Nietzsche on Morality.Brian Leiter - 2002/2014 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA
Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216.
Nietzsche's Pluralism About Consciousness.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):132-154.

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