European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31 (2005)
I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states have a conceptual articulation renders comprehensible Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is "superficial" and "falsifying.".
|Keywords||Nietzsche consciousness unconscious nonconceptual content conscious|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
Citations of this work BETA
Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216.
Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency.Mattia Riccardi - 2015 - Inquiry 58 (3):221-243.
Going to School with Friedrich Nietzsche: The Self in Service of Noble Culture.Douglas W. Yacek - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 33 (4):391-411.
Nietzsche's Pluralism About Consciousness.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):132-154.
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