The Problem of Normative Authority in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche
In Tom Bailey & João Constâncio (eds.), Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant, Volume I: Ethics. Bloomsbury (2017)
Abstract |
Kant and Hegel share a common foundational idea: they believe that the authority of normative claims can be justified only by showing that these norms are self-imposed or autonomous. Yet they develop this idea in strikingly different ways: Kant argues that we can derive specific normative claims from the formal idea of autonomy, whereas Hegel contends that we use the idea of freedom not to derive, but to assess, the specific normative claims ensconced in our social institutions and practices. Exploring these claims, I argue that each approach encounters certain difficulties. I then argue that Nietzsche develops a theory of normative authority that avoids these potential difficulties. Nietzsche’s theory proceeds, in part, by reconciling the most compelling aspects of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts—aspects that have seemed, to many interpreters, to be incompatible. The resultant theory generates a unique and fruitful account of normative authority.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
Save to my reading list
![]() ![]() |


No references found.

No citations found.

Shame and Punishment in Kant's Doctrine of Right.David Sussman - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):299–317.
Deriving Ethics From Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.
Assessing Law's Claim to Authority.Bas van der Vossen - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition.Robert Sinnerbrink - 2004 - Critical Horizons 5 (1):271-295.
Normative Authority for Empirical Science.Wim de Muijnck - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):263-275.
Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations.Karl Ameriks - 1992 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):219 – 232.
Added to PP index
2009-10-27
Total downloads
154 ( #34,608 of 2,224,474 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #114,243 of 2,224,474 )
2009-10-27
Total downloads
154 ( #34,608 of 2,224,474 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #114,243 of 2,224,474 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
