A Humean theory of moral intuition

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381 (2013)
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Abstract

According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which the phenomenal feel of emotions is crucial for their intentional content.

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Antti Kauppinen
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - 2020 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
Meaning and Happiness.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):161-185.
Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.Michael Milona - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):897-915.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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