Conditioning against the grain

Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606 (2004)
Authors
Stefan Kaufmann
University of Connecticut
Abstract
This paper discusses counterexamples to the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. It is argued that the discrepancy is systematic and predictable, and that conditional probabilities are crucially involved in the apparently deviant interpretations. Furthermore, the examples suggest that such conditionals have a less prominent reading on which their probability is in fact the conditional probability, and that the two readings are related by a simple step of abductive inference. Central to the proposal is a distinction between causal and purely stochastic dependence between variables
Keywords abduction  conditionals  probability
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DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046142.51136.bf
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
A Primer of Probability Logic.Ernest Adams - 1998 - Stanford: Csli Publications.

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Probabilities of Conditionals in Context.Justin Khoo - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-43.

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