Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and Conditionalization

In Hans-Christian Schmitz & Henk Zeevat (eds.), Bayesian Natural Language Semantics and Pragmatics. Springer. pp. 71-94 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers investigating the interpretation and use of conditional sentences have long been intrigued by the intuitive correspondence between the probability of a conditional `if A, then C' and the conditional probability of C, given A. Attempts to account for this intuition within a general probabilistic theory of belief, meaning and use have been plagued by a danger of trivialization, which has proven to be remarkably recalcitrant and absorbed much of the creative effort in the area. But there is a strategy for avoiding triviality that has been known for almost as long as the triviality results themselves. What is lacking is a straightforward integration of this approach in a larger framework of belief representation and dynamics. This paper discusses some of the issues involved and proposes an account of belief update by conditionalization.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Conditioning against the grain.Stefan Kaufmann - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606.
Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.
Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):259-266.
The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
Against the Ramsey test.A. Morton - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):294-299.
Adams conditionals and non-monotonic probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Conditionals, probability, and nontriviality.Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-27

Downloads
29 (#404,615)

6 months
2 (#297,737)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stefan Kaufmann
University of Connecticut

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references