Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability

Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)
Abstract
Everyone agrees that not all norms that govern belief and assertion are epistemic. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others. Norms in general differ from merely evaluative standards in virtue of the fact that it is fitting to hold subjects accountable for violating them, provided they lack an excuse. Different kinds of norm are most readily distinguished by their distinctive mode of accountability. My thesis is that a norm is epistemic if and only if its violation makes it pro tanto appropriate to reduce epistemic trust in the subject, even if there is no doubt about their sincerity, honesty, or other virtues. That is, violations of epistemic norms don’t merit resentment or other forms of blame, but rather (other things being equal) deduction of credibility points in internal scorekeeping and related attitudinal and behavioral changes. As Fricker’s work on epistemic harms shows, such distrust is undesirable from the point of view of an epistemic agent. Consequently, when one manifests epistemic distrust towards a subject in suitable circumstances, it amounts a way of holding her accountable. Finally, I make use of this diagnostic to show that many arguments in the contemporary debate about epistemic norms of assertion draw on wrong kind of intuitions. My aim is not to defend any substantive view, however, but only to offer tools for identifying the right kind of evidence for epistemic norms.
Keywords epistemic norms  accountability  normativity  sanctions  trust
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Epistemic Normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.
Epistemology Without Metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.
Theorizing About the Epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
XV-The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Added to PP index
2017-08-03

Total downloads
150 ( #36,312 of 2,231,661 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
91 ( #3,056 of 2,231,661 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature