Ethics 124 (3):572-588 (2014)

Authors
Antti Kauppinen
University of Helsinki
Abstract
This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly ideal when the most robust way of avoiding W-type practical problems is deferring to her endorsement
Keywords Fitting Attitudes Analysis  Subjectivism  Value  Ideal Subjectivism
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DOI 10.1086/674843
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References found in this work BETA

The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
Sentiment and Value.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (4):722-748.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Meaning and Happiness.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):161-185.
Moral Sentimentalism.Anttin D. Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.
Favoring.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1953-1971.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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