The Toxin Puzzle

Analysis 43 (1):33-36 (1983)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/43.1.33

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,210

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The toxin puzzle.Gilbert Harman - 1998 - In Jules L. Coleman & Christopher W. Morris (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 84--89.
Rethinking the toxin puzzle.David Gauthier - 1998 - In Jules L. Coleman & Christopher W. Morris (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 47--58.
Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Proto Sociology 8:39-52.
Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle.John Pittard - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):88-108.
On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle.Ken Levy - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
Intentions, reasons, and beliefs: Morals of the toxin puzzle.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):171 - 194.
The Wrong Kind of Reason and the Toxin Puzzle間違った種類の理由と毒パズル.Kodai Sato - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):43-53.
So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.
The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-03-15

Downloads
573 (#41,400)

6 months
33 (#111,492)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Games and the art of agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.

View all 252 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references