Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129 (2010)

Authors
Jason Kawall
Colgate University
Abstract
My central thesis is that philosophers considering questions of epistemic value ought to devote greater attention to the enduring nature of beliefs. I begin by arguing that a commonly drawn analogy between beliefs and actions is flawed in important respects, and that a better, more fruitful analogue for belief would be desire, or a similarly enduring state of an agent. With this in hand, I argue that treating beliefs as enduring, constitutive states of agents allows us to capture the importance of accessible, justified, and true beliefs to sustaining personal identity, autonomy, self-control, and authenticity. We thus arrive at a significant value to such beliefs through their crucial role in our personal, practical identities.
Keywords Epistemic Value  Epistemology  Autonomy  Agency  value of knowledge  epistemic virtue  memory
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0083
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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Autonomy and False Beliefs.Suzy Killmister - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531.

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