Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370 (2013)

Jason Kawall
Colgate University
Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud have both argued that the demands of being a good friend can conflict with the demands of standard epistemic norms. Intuitively, good friends will tend to seek favorable interpretations of their friends’ behaviors, interpretations that they would not apply to strangers; as such they seem prone to form unjustified beliefs. I argue that there is no such clash of norms. In particular, I argue that friendship does not require us to form beliefs about our friends in the biased fashion suggested by Stroud and Keller. I further argue that while some slight bias in belief-formation might be permitted by friendship, any such bias would fall within the bounds of epistemic propriety.
Keywords Friendship  Epistemology  Keller  Stroud  Epistemic norms
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9953-0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Believing in Others.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95.
II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.David Enoch - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):21-48.
Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.
Epistemic Normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Epistemology Without Metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
Friendship and Commercial Societies.Neera K. Badhwar - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (3):301-326.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Friendship.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Advantages of Civic Friendship.Joyce L. Jenkins - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24:459-471.
Epistemic Norms, Moral Norms, and Nature Appreciation.Robert Stecker - 2012 - Environmental Ethics 34 (3):247-264.
Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation.Jon Robson - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):750-763.


Added to PP index

Total views
856 ( #6,811 of 2,454,616 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,875 of 2,454,616 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes