Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-21 (2009)
AbstractIn this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate several distinct, though related, objections grounded in this intuition, and to argue that virtue ethicists have ample resources to respond to these worries. The explanatory primacy of the virtuous over the right or the good emerges as a distinct and viable position.
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Citations of this work
A Third Method of Ethics?Roger Crisp - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):257-273.
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Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment.Frans Svensson - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):321-339.
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References found in this work
Two Conceptions of Moral Realism.Jonathan Dancy - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Virtue Theory.Julia Driver - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell.