Authors
Jason Kawall
Colgate University
Abstract
In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate several distinct, though related, objections grounded in this intuition, and to argue that virtue ethicists have ample resources to respond to these worries. The explanatory primacy of the virtuous over the right or the good emerges as a distinct and viable position.
Keywords virtue ethics  virtues  primacy  euthyphro dilemma  right action
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v3i2.32
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Virtue Theory.Julia Driver - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What's Aristotelian About Neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?Sukaina Hirji - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):671-696.
A Third Method of Ethics?Roger Crisp - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):257-273.
A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Daniel Doviak - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-08-06

Total views
1,480 ( #2,031 of 2,349,872 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
341 ( #962 of 2,349,872 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes