Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369 (2004)

Authors
Jason Kawall
Colgate University
Abstract
Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.
Keywords ideal observer  Zangwill  moral response  moral response dependence  motive of duty  moral motivation
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DOI 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023392.52929.68
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Rönnedal - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):79-98.

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