Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369 (2004)
Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.
|Keywords||ideal observer Zangwill moral response moral response dependence motive of duty moral motivation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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