Ratio 15 (3):257–275 (2002)
AbstractEpistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as an expert), patience, and creativity. We can understand such traits to be epistemic virtues insofar as they tend to produce knowledge – not for the agent alone, but for her community. Recognition of such ‘otherregarding epistemic virtues’ both broadens the area of inquiry of epistemology, and introduces new standards for the evaluation of epistemic agents.
Similar books and articles
Evaluating need for cognition: A case study in naturalistic epistemic virtue theory.Reza Lahroodi - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):227 – 245.
Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.
Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Professor Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481-502.
Epistemic virtues and the deliberative frame of mind.Adam Kovach - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):105 – 115.
Epistemic responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Problems for virtue theories in epistemology.Robert Lockie - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Self-trust and critical thinking online: a relational account.Lavinia Marin & Samantha Marie Copeland - 2022 - Social Epistemology.
References found in this work
Testimonial knowledge and transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.
Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:271-285.
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 1992 - In Philosophical Issues. Cambridge: Mass.: Mit Press. pp. 271-285.