The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being

Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387 (1999)
Abstract
It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maintaining that the impact of such values upon our well-being lies in their impact upon our mental lives.
Keywords experience machine  hedonism  mental state  Nozick  welfare  well-being
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004557501837
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Hedonism Reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
How to Use the Experience Machine.Eden Lin - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):314-332.
If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real?Felipe De Brigard - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):536-562.
The Objectivity of Wellbeing.Matt Ferkany - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):472-492.

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