Philosophy of Science 62 (1):92-110 (1995)
AbstractI critically explore various forms of the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. Many considerations, including the complexity of representational content and the systematicity of language understanding, support the view that some, but not all, of our mental representations occur in a language. I examine several arguments concerning sententialism and the propositional attitudes, Fodor's arguments concerning infant and animal thought, and Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism and show that none of these considerations require us to postulate a LOT that is innate or otherwise distinct from spoken languages. Instead, I suggest that we maintain the more conservative hypothesis, supported by introspection, that some of our thoughts occur in the languages that we speak
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Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):898-901.
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Citations of this work
What Would It Mean for Natural Language to Be the Language of Thought?Gabe Dupre - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (4):773-812.
Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations.Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator - 2003 - Cognitive Science 23 (1):73-110.
Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations.Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (1):73-109.
Systematicity and Conceptual Pluralism.Fernando Martinez-Manrique - 2014 - In Paco Calvo John Symons (ed.), The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. MIT Press. pp. 305-334.
A Scientific Psychologistic Foundation for Theories of Meaning.Lawrence J. Kaye - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (2):187-206.
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