Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74 (2021)

Authors
Alireza Kazemi
Sharif University of Technology (Alumnus)
Abstract
ABSTRACT In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against the view. Second, it is shown that the committive dimension is rich and flexible enough to accommodate all the apparently problematic cases.
Keywords folk psychology  intentional psychology  normativism  Robert Brandom
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Reprint years 2022
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2021.1963820
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References found in this work BETA

How to Derive "Ought" From "Is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
The Normativity of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):123-125.

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