Supervaluationism and Validity

Philosophical Topics 28 (1):93-105 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper explores several different accounts of validity within the supervaluationist framework that coincide in the absence of the D operator but differ once that operator is introduced. It argues that the alternatives have different advantages and suggests a form of a pluralism about notions of validity within the supervaluationist framework.

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Rosanna Keefe
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

What logical pluralism cannot be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
Supervaluationism, Modal Logic, and Weakly Classical Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):411-61.
Vagueness: Supervaluationism.Rosanna Keefe - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.
Vagueness and Relative Truth.Andrea Iacona - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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