When does circularity matter?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper asks whether a good philosophical account of something can ever be circular. It explores the kind of circumstances in which an account of F might involve F itself while still serving the functions of and meeting the requirements on a philosophical account. The paper discusses two criteria for acceptable circularity, based on ideas from Humberstone 1997. And it illustrates the surprisingly wide variety of kinds of accounts in which circularity need not be bad

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Rosanna Keefe
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

What Work the Fundamental?Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):359-379.
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.
When is circularity in definitions benign?J. A. Burgess - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.

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