Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge: Foundationalism versus Coherentism

Metaphilosophy 34 (5):543-552 (2003)
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Abstract

Chisholm refuted phenomenalism as a theory of the justification of perceptual beliefs. He argued, following Thomas Reid, that some perceptual beliefs were justified in themselves, which provided a foundation for empirical knowledge. The question that remains is whether the foundational justification provided offers an adequate explanation of how justification is connected with truth. The search for a truth connection led me from foundationalism to a coherence theory of justification that, contrary to my intentions, was inspired by an observation of Chisholm himself.

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Keith Lehrer
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Perception, discrimination, and knowledge.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):39-53.

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References found in this work

Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Charles A. Baylis - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):600-601.
Philosophical Essays.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):189-195.

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