History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140 (1987)
AbstractIn this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge; in other respects, it is related to a suggestion of Gödel. But, as a whole, it suggests an original solution to the Liar paradox, quite unlike any current proposals
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Citations of this work
A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences.C. Dutilh Novaes - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):227-261.
A Theory of Truth Based on a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox.Richard L. Epstein - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):149-177.
A New–Old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.
Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth, Written by Simmons, K.George Englebretsen - 2020 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2):499-506.
True Friendship and the Logic of Lying.Sharon M. Kaye - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):475-485.
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