On a medieval solution to the liar paradox

History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140 (1987)
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In this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge; in other respects, it is related to a suggestion of Gödel. But, as a whole, it suggests an original solution to the Liar paradox, quite unlike any current proposals



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Keith Simmons
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

A theory of truth based on a medieval solution to the liar paradox.Richard L. Epstein - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):149-177.
True friendship and the logic of lying.Sharon M. Kaye - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):475-485.
A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.

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