Philosophia 12 (March):273-281 (1983)
This paper argues against foundationalism not on the familiar ground that a person may be mistaken about the object of any of his cognitive states, But on the new ground that a person may be mistaken in identifying any mental states as cognitive. The argument is claimed to hold against all version of foundationalism
|Keywords||Epistemology Foundationalism Incorrigibility Logical Truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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