phenomenology and logical analysis. John Searle and Bert Dreyfus are for me two of the paradigm figures of contemporary philosophy, so I am extremely proud to have been offered the opportunity to engage with their work. The editors of The Harvard Review of Philosophy, it seems to me, have shown a keen sense of what is deep and important in our discipline by publishing extended interviews with these two influential thinkers. At the same time, writing this article meant entering into a debate between Searle and Dreyfus about the priority of their respective philosophical methodologies, and this, I am afraid, is at best a no-win situation. My strategy, therefore, has been to try to engage as sympathetically as possible with the programs of each philosopher, and to draw from their work lessons that seem to me important for any philosophical account of intentionality and social reality. I have not shied away from criticism; indeed the whole paper is an extended series of criticisms of the work of both philosophers. But I hope they will recognize this for what it is: an engagement with the work of each that is based on the deepest respect and admiration. Before I jump into the fray, I should mention that I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Searle and Dreyfus as well. They were not only my two advisors in graduate school, but were the two main reasons I entered philosophy. Having become dissatisfied with the formal worlds of mathematics and computer science, their respective critiques of artificial intelligence and cognitivism showed me the rich possibilities of philosophy and struck me as a reason to become a philosopher. It is a difficult discipline, sometimes unforgiving; but I am glad I followed them into it.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1062-6239
DOI 10.5840/harvardreview20051329
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,156
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
On Being Motivated.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
Heidegger on Assertion, Method and Metaphysics.Sacha Golob - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):878-908.
The Space of Motivations.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):440-455.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Collins’s Incorrect Depiction of Dreyfus’s Critique of Artificial Intelligence.Evan Selinger - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):301-308.
Existential Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Mark Wrathall & Sean Kelly - 1996 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (4).
The Phenomenology of Freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3/4):189.


Added to PP index

Total views
211 ( #43,465 of 2,411,731 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #539,061 of 2,411,731 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes