Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633 (2008)
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Abstract |
Suppose that you and I disagree about some non-straightforward matter of fact (say, about whether capital punishment tends to have a deterrent effect on crime). Psychologists have demonstrated the following striking phenomenon: if you and I are subsequently exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on the question, doing so tends to increase the extent of our initial disagreement. That is, in response to exactly the same evidence, each of us grows increasingly confident of his or her original view; we thus become increasingly polarized as our common evidence increases. I consider several alternative models of how people reason about newly-acquired evidence which seems to disconfirm their prior beliefs. I then explore the normative implications of these models for the phenomenon in question
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Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
DOI | 10.5840/jphil20081051024 |
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References found in this work BETA
On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge.Saul Kripke - 2011 - In Saul A. Kripke (ed.), Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.
Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (S1):S379 - S389.
Citations of this work BETA
Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System.Eric Mandelbaum - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.
Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.
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