Discusiones Filosóficas 7 (10):77-87 (2006)

Sean Kelly
Harvard University
En este artículo se critica la forma en quePeacocke defiende la tesis de que laexperiencia tiene un contenido noconceptual.En particular, se argumentaquela apelación de Peacocke a la idea dequeel contenido no-conceptual de laexperienciaes mucho más fino que elcontenidoconceptual, no funciona.Finalmente,se sostiene que ladependenciade un objeto percibido conrespectoal contexto perceptual en el cualsepercibe, y la dependencia de unapropiedadpercibida con respecto alobjetoen el cual es percibida son rasgosmásrelevantes para la tesis de que elcontenidoperceptual de la experiencia esno-conceptual.In this paper I criticize the way in which Peacocke defends the thesis that experience has non-conceptual content. In particular, I argue that Peacocke’s reliance on the idea that the experience’s non conceptua lcontent is far more subtle than conceptual content, does not work. Lastly,Ihold that the dependence of a perceived objectfrom the perceptual context inwhichsuch an object is perceived, and thedependenceof a received property from the object in which it is perceived are more relevant features for the thesis that the perceptual content of experience is non-conceptual
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Phenomenology of Perception.Mary Warnock - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):372-375.
Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381-388.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual?Sean D. Kelly - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
On the vicinity of poetry and thought in Martin Heidegger. [Spanish].Rubén Darío Maldonado Ortega - 2003 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 1:30-45.
Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content.Frederick R. Ablondi - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.


Added to PP index

Total views
9 ( #928,073 of 2,454,833 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,241 of 2,454,833 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes