Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):27-37 (2016)
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Abstract

In Kelp, it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake Barn cases, they generate a problem for the two most prominent virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge, due to Ernest Sosa and John Greco.

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Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.
Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Purifying impure virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.
Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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