Following the argument where it leads

Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124 (2011)
Abstract
Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or ‘Moorean’ responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing
Keywords Argument  Belief  Common sense  Rationality  Intellectual ideals
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9704-7
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

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Citations of this work BETA
How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):408-435.
Why Simpler Arguments Are Better.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):247-261.
Disagreement and the Value of Self-Trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.
Zande Sorites.Roy Sorensen - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S7):1-14.

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