How to be an Epistemic Permissivist


Abstract
Roger’s official statement of the thesis that he defends reads as follows: Uniqueness : If an agent whose total evidence is E is fully rational in taking doxastic attitude D to P, then necessarily, any subject with total evidence E who takes a different attitude to P is less than fully rational. Following Roger, I’ll call someone who denies Uniqueness a Permissivist . In what follows, I’ll argue against Uniqueness and defend Permissivism
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
Immoderately Rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.

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