Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100 (2016)
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Abstract

Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton, Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.

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Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Theory of inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):359-384.
Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

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