Learning theory and the philosophy of science

Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267 (1997)
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/392550
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Oliver Schulte (1999). The Logic of Reliable and Efficient Inquiry. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (4):399-438.
Gregor Betz (2016). Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

31 ( #155,008 of 1,925,069 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #418,130 of 1,925,069 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.