Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267 (1997)
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability
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The Logic of Reliable and Efficient Inquiry.Oliver Schulte - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (4):399-438.
Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.
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