Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00059.x

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,484

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

A warranted-assertability defense of a Moorean response to skepticism.Tim Black - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205.
The Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability: a rejoinder to Roberts.Benjamin Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (4):266-267.
Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.
Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore?Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 118-134.
Contextualism and Skepticism About the External World.Tim Black - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Wright on Moore.José L. Zalabardo - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 304–322.
Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.
Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
Ramseyan Humility, scepticism and grasp.Alexander Kelly - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):705-726.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
238 (#100,069)

6 months
27 (#117,293)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.
Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 185.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

View all 104 references / Add more references