On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets

Philosophy of Science 90 (1):92-128 (2023)
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Abstract

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions including countably infinite partitions.

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Mikayla Kelley
University of Chicago

References found in this work

In Favor of Logarithmic Scoring.Randall G. McCutcheon - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):286-303.
Probabilism for stochastic theories.Jer Steeger - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 66:34–44.
Conclusion.[author unknown] - 1926 - Archives de Philosophie 4 (3):112.

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