On Knockdown Arguments

Erkenntnis 80 (6):1205-1215 (2015)
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Abstract

Nathan Ballantyne argues that the knockdown status of certain non-philosophical arguments can be transferred to arguments for substantive philosophical conclusions. Thus, if there are knockdown non-philosophical arguments, there are knockdown philosophical arguments. I show that Ballantyne’s argument is unsound, since arguments that are knockdown in non-philosophical contexts may become question-begging when used to argue for philosophical conclusions

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John A. Keller
Saint Joseph's University of Pennsylvania

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