Stability and Partiality in Hume’s Moral Philosophy: A Response to Louis Loeb

Hume Studies 30 (2):329-338 (2004)

Hume’s moral philosophy is a sentiment-based view. Moral judgment is a matter of the passions; certain traits of character count as virtues or vices because of the approval or disapproval they evoke in us, feelings that express concern we have about the social effects of these traits. A sentiment-based approach is attractive, since morality seems fundamentally to involve caring for other people. Sentiment-based views, however, face a real challenge. It is clear that our affections are often particular; we favor certain persons over others. This poses a problem when it comes to determining the proper content of morality. The ties of sentiment would seem to be in tension with the aspirations of morality toward impartiality and universality.
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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Reprint years 2004
ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI hume200430219
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Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):612-637.

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