In H. DeRegt, S. Hartmann & S. Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 101--110 (2012)
Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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