Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):411-426 (2011)
Abstract
This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must be cognised in order to enable subsequent memory of it, for Dharmakīrti it must be cognised if it is to cognise an objectAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10781-011-9139-7
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Citations of this work
Dignāga's Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69:144-156.
Buddhist Idealism.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2017 - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 178-199.
Is consciousness reflexively self‐aware? A Buddhist analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
Utpaladeva’s Lost Vivṛti on the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā.Raffaele Torella - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (1):115-126.
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Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge.Bimal Krishna Matilal - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
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Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions.Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Self-Awareness in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading.Birgit Kellner - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):203-231.