In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 324--338 (2009)
This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of semantic anti-realismis shown to have considerable prima facie appeal. It is then argued that some key objections that one might raise for this approach are on closer inspection ineffective
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A Church-Fitch Proof for the Universality of Causation.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2749-2772.
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