Erin Kelly
University of Colorado, Boulder
Tommie Shelby argues that social injustice undermines the moral standing states would have, were they just, to condemn criminal wrongdoers. He makes a good argument, but he does not go far enough to reject the blaming function of punishment. Shelby’s argument from “impure dissent,” in particular, helps to demonstrate the limits of blame in criminal justice.
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DOI 10.1007/s11572-019-09498-5
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Is Blame Warranted in Applying Justice?Erin I. Kelly - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-17.
Rethinking Criminal Justice.Erin I. Kelly - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (2):169-183.

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